Report count · logarithmic scaleNo assigned reportsToday's reportsSelected country
Timeline2021 – 2022
20212022
Group overview
Limited group intelligence
quantum is a name appearing in public reports monitored by Cybermonit. The local dataset links it to 74 reports concerning 74 organizations, with observations from 2021-11-04 to 2022-12-09. This profile brings together those reports, their geographic distribution and related coverage. These are source observations; they do not establish when the group formed or how many attacks have been independently confirmed.
Modus operandi
The available data is insufficient to establish this group’s intrusion and post-compromise methods. A ransom-site listing alone does not demonstrate exploitation of a vulnerability, encryption of systems or a particular ATT&CK technique. The tables below include only relationships documented in sources.
Observations from the local dataset
Public reports
74
Organizations in dataset
74
Reports in 30 days
0
First observation in dataset
Nov 4, 2021
Latest report
Dec 9, 2022
Operational summary
Initial access
Insufficient evidence in the profile sources.
Lateral movement
Insufficient evidence in the profile sources.
Extortion and impact
Insufficient evidence in the profile sources.
Tools and malware
Insufficient evidence in the profile sources.
Documented vulnerabilities (0)
Relationships documented in the cited reports concern specific campaigns or affiliates; they do not mean that a CVE was used in every attack.
No source currently documents exploitation of a specific CVE by this group in our dataset.
MITRE ATT&CK (0)
Techniques mapped by MITRE or the cited researchers. Source context distinguishes actor behavior, campaign observations and malware capabilities.
No documented technique mapping in the available sources.
Two trusted stations 195 meters apart can check whether a party claiming a location is really there, without taking its hardware on faith. NIST physicist Krister Shalm and an international team ran the protocol in a research building in Boulder, Colorado, closing loopholes that let cheaters beat earlier quantum location schemes. A distant prover can't answer in time because nothing beats the speed of light, and copying the quantum information destroys the correlations checked in the Bell test. Shalm calls it "the first complete demonstration of such a protocol," but it remains a lab result inside one building. NIST physicist Scott Glancy puts practical use more than a decade away, since it needs high-fidelity quantum networks and near-complete photon detection.
Two verifier stations 195 meters apart on the NIST campus in Boulder, Colorado, checked whether a person claiming a location was really there. NIST scientists and an international team reported in Nature a quantum position verification (QPV) method that combines entangled photons, random challenges and timing of responses. Random instructions stop a fraudster from sending answers early, and the speed-of-light limit exposes a prover outside the claimed region, whose reply would arrive too late. According to the authors, a loophole-free Bell test, which shows that entangled photons are more strongly correlated than classical physics allows, is passed only if the equipment works and the prover follows the instructions, giving verifiers certainty about location. NIST physicist Scott Glancy, a study collaborator, says practical use may be more than a decade away, and the experiment was a controlled lab test, not a deployed security system.
The GSA tested new post-quantum algorithms directly on the chips of smart PIV cards, the Personal Identity Verification cards that staff use to enter buildings, log into computers and sign official documents. Dan Pomeroy, deputy associate administrator at GSA, assesses at FedTalks that agencies can obtain quantum-resistant credentials on cards they already have; this is his assessment, not an independently verified result. Post-quantum cryptography usually requires larger keys and signatures, which may be a problem for satellites with weaker connections, though in many cases agencies can switch algorithms in existing systems. An executive order moved the mandatory federal deadline for the transition from 2035 to 2030 and cut by more than half the time agencies had for public key encryption, while IBM's Vanessa Hunt, a vendor executive, believes the biggest gap is visibility into where the cryptography protecting sensitive data sits.
Malicious actors are already collecting encrypted data now so they can decrypt it later, even though quantum computers capable of breaking current encryption have not yet emerged. The National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) recommends that states inventory cryptographic systems, prioritize the ability to quickly adapt encryption standards, and include quantum-resistant requirements in future procurement. According to figures cited in the article, 73% of state chief information officers are monitoring quantum computing developments, but only 14% have formal quantum-safe security initiatives underway. Experts warn of a potential turning point, Q-Day, which could occur by the early 2030s, and migration to post-quantum cryptography may take up to 15 years for large enterprise systems.
An unauthorized update reached users of German drone maker Quantum Systems after, according to reports, attackers compromised the server used to push updates for QBase, its mission-planning software. The company, which supplies reconnaissance and interceptor drones to the German military and Ukrainian forces, confirmed the attack in late October, said it detected the breach after the update was distributed, and worked with German authorities. It says it has resolved the issue. Reports indicate the attack could have threatened the integrity of systems such as the Vector reconnaissance drone, and the German armed forces reportedly grounded some drones as a precaution. Analysts see it as part of a wider pattern of attacks on European defense contractors supporting Ukraine, but this is their view, not an established finding. The source does not identify the attackers or their motives, and the investigation continues.
The U.S. Department of Commerce is considering export controls to protect intellectual property in the quantum computing sector. Officials are increasingly concerned that China's manufacturing capacity could erode the American lead, even though the U.S. leads in research. According to Deputy Secretary of Commerce Paul Dabbar, the challenge is turning scientific breakthroughs into large-scale industrial production. Federal programs, including grants under the CHIPS and Science Act, aim to support companies investing over $2 billion in the sector. Senator Ben Ray Luján, a commission co-chair, says private firms must improve security practices to prevent theft of sensitive technology secrets.
Report publication date, falling back to first source discovery. This is not necessarily the attack date. Aggregates cover the entire filtered dataset.
Reports by year
Year
Reports
Reports over time
Top sectors
Most attacked countries — whole group
Top 5 attacked TLDs
The country chart compares all group countries in the selected period. Selecting a country filters monthly reports, TLDs and the victim list. TLD is the final part of a known organization domain, e.g. .uk for a .co.uk domain. Reports without a domain are excluded from this ranking.