Report count · logarithmic scaleNo assigned reportsToday's reportsSelected country
Timeline2022
2022
Group overview
Limited group intelligence
relic is a name appearing in public reports monitored by Cybermonit. The local dataset links it to 5 reports concerning 5 organizations, with observations from 2022-11-14 to 2022-11-14. This profile brings together those reports, their geographic distribution and related coverage. These are source observations; they do not establish when the group formed or how many attacks have been independently confirmed.
Modus operandi
The available data is insufficient to establish this group’s intrusion and post-compromise methods. A ransom-site listing alone does not demonstrate exploitation of a vulnerability, encryption of systems or a particular ATT&CK technique. The tables below include only relationships documented in sources.
Observations from the local dataset
Public reports
5
Organizations in dataset
5
Reports in 30 days
0
First observation in dataset
Nov 14, 2022
Latest report
Nov 14, 2022
Operational summary
Initial access
Insufficient evidence in the profile sources.
Lateral movement
Insufficient evidence in the profile sources.
Extortion and impact
Insufficient evidence in the profile sources.
Tools and malware
Insufficient evidence in the profile sources.
Documented vulnerabilities (0)
Relationships documented in the cited reports concern specific campaigns or affiliates; they do not mean that a CVE was used in every attack.
No source currently documents exploitation of a specific CVE by this group in our dataset.
MITRE ATT&CK (0)
Techniques mapped by MITRE or the cited researchers. Source context distinguishes actor behavior, campaign observations and malware capabilities.
No documented technique mapping in the available sources.
Holding stolen super admin credentials, Cold Relic attackers kept sending MFA push notifications until an overwhelmed user approved one. In late 2025 they took employee lists and emails from the cloud environment of a US organization. Earlier this year, impersonating that employee over an encrypted messaging app, they sent a person at a second organization phishing links disguised as documents. After stealing Microsoft Entra ID credentials and tokens, they reached Google Workspace through federated single sign-on. A US government assessment links the group to Russia's FSB, while measures such as phishing-resistant MFA are advice from Google experts, not research findings.
Data and identities harvested from a separate entity in 2025 were used in 2026 to break into a U.S.-based organization, according to investigators at Mandiant and Google's Threat Intelligence Group. Cold Relic, also known as Star Blizzard and assessed by the source as Russia-linked, reportedly gets in through stolen credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) fatigue, meaning repeated login approval prompts until the victim accepts one. It then registers rogue devices and passkeys, deletes evidence through administrative consoles, and exports employee data via Google Takeout. In one reported case, it compromised a second organization by harvesting credentials through federated single sign-on (SSO) identity providers. The article's author assesses that such operations may turn routine business communications into attack vectors against partners across Europe and North America, but the source gives no victim counts or campaign scope.
A message from someone in the same professional circle may come from an impersonating attacker, according to Google, which links the group Cold Relic to Russia. In late 2025, attackers took over a Super Admin account in the cloud environment of an unnamed U.S. organization, registered their own MFA device, and used Google Takeout to export employee lists and domain-wide data. That data supported phishing over a secure messaging app, and stolen credentials then gave access to a Microsoft Entra ID account at a second U.S. organization, which used Entra ID as single sign-on (SSO) for Google Workspace. The article does not name either organization or give the number of affected accounts. The phrase 'Russian intelligence services' comes from a Google quote, and the article offers no independent evidence of state direction.
An attacker writes in an encrypted messaging app as an employee of a company its target already knows, and the link leads to a document lure matching the conversation. According to Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant, the Russian group COLD RELIC, also known as Star Blizzard, took over a Microsoft Entra ID user account at a second US organization in 2026 this way. Earlier, in late 2025, the same group downloaded names, email addresses and email archives from the first organization; the authors believe these contacts helped select the next target, but this is their inference, not a confirmed fact. The US Department of Justice has assessed that the group operates within Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB); this is the DOJ's assessment, not a Mandiant finding.
New Relic has announced Ground Truth CLI to bring production troubleshooting and service-recovery checks into terminal workflows. The company says the interface combines telemetry and operational context with Autopilot, NerdGraph and memory APIs for developers and AI agents. It also supports preserving investigation results and evidence for review, resumption or handoff to another engineer. These capabilities are intended to be accessible programmatically to scripts and continuous integration pipelines as well.
Report publication date, falling back to first source discovery. This is not necessarily the attack date. Aggregates cover the entire filtered dataset.
Reports by year
Year
Reports
Reports over time
Top sectors
Most attacked countries — whole group
Top 5 attacked TLDs
The country chart compares all group countries in the selected period. Selecting a country filters monthly reports, TLDs and the victim list. TLD is the final part of a known organization domain, e.g. .uk for a .co.uk domain. Reports without a domain are excluded from this ranking.